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Despite violations of several common assumptions regarding the use of control, platform ecosystems 
rely heavily on such mechanisms.  This calls into question whether controls serve purposes other than 
just the alignment of their participants’ interests, as the extant literature suggests. We develop a model 
that explains how and why control mechanisms influence performance of applications in a mobile 
computing platform ecosystem.   Our model uncovers an apparent paradox in that controls influence 
performance because they promote knowledge integration but simultaneously inhibit differentiation. 
Knowledge is embedded within controls, which allows developers to leverage it in developing high-
quality applications.  However, leveraging the same knowledge stock inhibits the extent to which 
developers can differentiate their work from others. Taking into consideration endogenous instruments 
of control, we will test our model using data collected from Research-in-Motion’s Blackberry AppWorld.  
Our results will extend the current understanding of the purpose and use of controls in platforms. 
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Introduction 
The ‘app economy’, or generally the market driven by the sale of mobile computing devices and the apps 
or other digital goods that are consumed on such devices, generated an estimated $20 billion in revenues 
in 2011 with expectations of over $75 billion in revenues by the year 2015 (Rubinson Partners, Inc. 2011).  
The core infrastructure supporting the app economy is a collection of software-based platforms, defined 
as “the extensible codebase of a software-based system that provides core functionality shared by the 
modules that interoperate with it and the interfaces through which they interoperate” (Tiwana et al. 
2010). These platforms create an overall ecosystem in which numerous participants, including the 
platform owner (such as RIM, Google, or Apple), app developers and end users, all transact with one 
another in complex ways. The astounding growth of these platform ecosystems offers IS researchers 
unique and unprecedented research and theory development opportunities. 
Software-based platform ecosystems have significantly blurred conventional firm boundaries by 
incorporating third-party app developers into innovation activities that were historically done in-house or 
contracted to outside partners. The premise is that a large pool of outside complementors with diverse 
expertise and market-like motivations will out-innovate a smaller scale in-house department. The 
challenge however is that the work of such complementors (hereafter simply app developers) must be 
integrated into the platform without sacrificing differentiation in their work. Of particular importance is 
the notion of organizational control in which one party (the controller) enforces some form of monitoring 
and evaluation on another party (the controllee).  The platform owner serves as the controller and the app 
developer the controlee in a platform ecosystem. It is worth noting that in a platform setting, an app 
developer can be an individual human being or a group of individuals working together as an 
organization.  For the purposes of this paper, we use the term app developer to refer to an organization 
that produces a complementary app, even though some are comprised of only a single person.  Controls 
therefore exert an influence on all individuals working on app development activities, even if they are part 
of a larger organization. 
While previous research has established a link between control and performance of IS development 
projects (Gopal and Gosain 2010; Tiwana and Keil 2007, 2009) thus suggesting that control may improve 
performance in a platform, four key assumptions in the traditional controls literature are violated to some 
degree in platforms.  First, unlike traditional settings where control is used as a mechanism for aligning 
the interest of two divergent parties (Ouchi 1979), the interests of the platform owner and app developer 
are not necessarily misaligned.  This is because both parties are highly motivated to sell apps in the 
marketplace.  Second, the platform ecosystem resembles a classic market more than it does a principal-
agent relationship, a situation in which overt control beyond price mechanisms is rarely needed (Ouchi 
1979, 1980).  Third, unlike traditional systems development projects with a defined start and end point 
where requirements are compiled, budgets are set, and timelines are enforced (Tiwana and Keil 2007, 
2009), formal requirements, delegation by a principal, and a definitive end-point are typically absent in 
platform app development activities.  Finally, unlike dyadic client-developer relationships studied in the 
IS controls literature, the sheer scale of the number of app developers can make traditional control 
mechanisms prohibitively costly (e.g., Apple’s iOS platform has 600,000 app developers working on 
individual projects that the platform owner cannot readily keep up with). These violations of commonly 
held assumptions for the effective use of control cast some doubt on the interest-alignment motivation 
behind using control mechanisms and the purposes they serve in a platform.  
Although the conditions associated with the use of control mechanisms are absent, a variety of control 
mechanisms are widely observed in platforms. For example, platform owners (such as RIM and Apple) 
review all applications to ensure they meet certain criteria before making them available in the public 
marketplace.  Further, platform owners issue development guidelines and provide standardized 
development & testing environments in the form of software development kits to control the manner in 
which development work is performed by app developers. The presence of these control mechanisms 
raises the question of whether controls serve other coordinative functions beyond just the divergent-
interest-alignment explanation in existing controls research. In summary, existing theory provides limited 
insight into the manner in which control influences the market performance of applications in a platform 
ecosystem.  Further, we know little regarding the explanatory mechanisms that describe why control 
exerts an influence on application performance in the marketplace. Thus, we are guided by the following 
research question: 
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How and why do different control mechanisms influence the performance of 
applications in a platform ecosystem? 
Theoretical Development 
Control refers to any attempt by one party (the controller) to influence or motivate another party (the 
controllee) to act in accordance with the controller’s goals and/or objectives (Ouchi 1979).  Researchers 
have broken control into two main categories, each with several types of control: formal control (process, 
output and input control) and informal control (clan and self control). Process control is the extent to 
which the application developer follows pre-specified methods and procedures for developing updates to 
an application (Kirsch et al. 2002).  Input control is defined as the extent to which the application 
developer positions updates to its application to have a higher likelihood of being accepted by the 
platform owner for distribution on the platform.  Clan control can be defined as the extent to which the 
application developer adapts its behaviors in an effort to embrace the set of beliefs, norms, and values 
the platform owner attempts to foster among its developer community (Ouchi 1979). Self control is the 
extent to which the application developer autonomously defines goals and executes procedures to 
accomplish those personal goals (Henderson and Lee 1992).  Output control is omitted from our model 
because we are interested in controls enforced by the platform owner.  End users in the marketplace 
enforce output control using financial rewards and penalties to developers based on their published 
applications.   
Note that the aforementioned definitions focus on the notion of realized, not attempted, control. 
Traditional control studies focus on attempted control since they measure the extent to which a controller 
takes certain actions. The notion of realized control, or “the extent to which the controller is able to 
successfully exercise a given control mechanism” (Tiwana and Keil 2009), has been mentioned in passing 
without any further theoretical development or empirical investigation.  All of our definitions of control 
focus on the manner in which a controllee abides by an attempted control mechanism and the behavioral 
changes that result because of this.  We believe this is an important distinction because not every attempt 
at enforcing a control mechanism is successful in achieving its intended goal.  Indeed, Ouchi (1978) states 
that “let us note that, whether the control process is based on behavior or on output, it is always behavior 
that is the ultimate objective of feedback and change” (p. 175).  This quote refers to the fact that the key 
consideration of a control mechanism is not whether it is merely communicated, but whether it results in 
some behavioral change desired by the controller. The platform context offers an unusually appropriate 
setting to theoretically develop the notion of realized control because one set of control mechanisms is 
attempted across a wide population of controlleees and it is impossible to actively monitor all control 
mechanisms. Since the platform owner cannot fully monitor the actions and behaviors of every single app 
developer in the platform ecosystem, we expect there to be variance in the extent to which control 
mechanisms are realized.  Further, developers do not randomly select control mechanisms to abide by – 
certain factors influence the extent to which they abide by various control mechanisms.  We therefore 
identify and evaluate these factors as endogenous instruments in our proposed model.   
Existing measures of performance in control research have included ISD performance (Tiwana and Keil 
2009), alliance performance (Tiwana and Keil 2007), and project efficiency/quality (Gopal and Gosain 
2010).  All measures focus on the controller’s evaluation of the work performed by the controllee but we 
are ultimately interested in how the marketplace evaluates an application. Therefore, our dependent 
variable is relative market performance, defined as the marketplace’s evaluation of an application’s 
quality relative to other similar applications offered in the same platform ecosystem. We argue that 
application developers join a platform in hopes of achieving high levels of performance for their 
applications.  In joining a platform, an application developer is able to draw on expertise beyond its own 
existing stock of knowledge however strictly relying on the provided stock of knowledge inhibits the ability 
to be individualistic and differentiate one’s app from others.  This apparent paradox between integrating 
knowledge provided by the platform owner and differentiating an application from competitors is 
discussed next.     
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Figure 1: Proposed Research Model 
Knowledge Integration 
We define knowledge integration as the extent to which the application developer coordinates its existing 
stock of knowledge with that of the platform owner in the development of an application.  The concept of 
knowledge integration focuses on two primary components, coordination and application of specialized 
knowledge (Mitchell 2006; Tiwana and McLean 2005) – both of which are emphasized in our definition.   
In Grant’s (1996a) knowledge-based view of the firm, it is argued that knowledge is the most strategically 
important resource a firm possesses.  However, it is imperative that the firm effectively coordinates and 
leverages its stock of knowledge in order to achieve competitive advantage.  As demonstrated in the study 
of system development (Faraj and Sproull 2000) and enterprise application integration (Mitchell 2006), 
effectively integrating knowledge results in greater performance than relying only on a sole source of 
knowledge thereby suggesting that performance of an application will be increased when developers 
effectively integrate knowledge from multiple sources. 
One potential source for external knowledge is a control mechanism enforced by the platform owner. 
Control mechanisms are not mindlessly derived – they are based on previous experience and knowledge 
of the work that is to be performed. Control mechanisms can serve as the mechanism by which knowledge 
is transferred from the controller to the controllee.  This is true for both explicit (or easily codified 
knowledge) and tacit (or experiential-based) knowledge, however explicit knowledge is far easier to 
transfer (Grant 1996b).  Explicit knowledge can be transferred via simple communication in the form of 
written procedures, rules, or specifications.  Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, requires immersion and 
observation in order to be effectively transferred (Nonaka 1994).  Formal control mechanisms, therefore, 
serve as a mechanism for the controller to communicate explicit knowledge to the controllee through 
written instruction and rules.  Alternatively, informal control mechanisms, such as clan control, involve 
immersion and fostering relational capital, which provides a mechanism for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge. The transfer of knowledge is not sufficient for gains in performance however (Tiwana and 
McLean 2005), thus we do not expect to see a direct effect of control on performance. Control will only 
influence performance because this knowledge is effectively integrated into the development of an 
application. 
Since most platform owners also develop applications for their own platforms, they have substantial 
experience in the development process of taking an idea and translating it into an application.  This 
experience results in codified knowledge that is embedded within process control mechanisms.  When 
developers abide by process control mechanisms, it gives them the opportunity to integrate the procedural 
knowledge embedded in control, thus allowing the developer to leverage the best practices laid forth by 
the platform owner.  In doing so, performance of the application that is developed should improve.   
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Hypothesis 1A: Greater use of process control will enhance the relative market performance of an 
application because it increases the degree to which knowledge is integrated by the application’s 
developer. 
For input control, platform owners embed knowledge concerning the characteristics of an acceptable 
high-quality application.  By providing criteria that will be assessed in the application review process as 
well as justifications for why applications are rejected, the platform owner codifies knowledge concerning 
the characteristics of a high-quality application.  With repeated interactions, the developer gains a better 
understanding of the platform owner’s expectations of a high-quality app.  This will result in the 
development of applications that are more successful. 
Hypothesis 1B: Greater use of input control will enhance the relative market performance of an 
application because it increases the degree to which knowledge is integrated by the application’s 
developer 
In terms of clan control, tacit knowledge is deeply embedded within the norms and routines of the clan 
(here, producer-participants in the platform’s ecosystem). Members of the clan have fully internalized 
these shared values and therefore have access to the tacit knowledge provided by other members of the 
clan (Ouchi 1980). Integrating the tacit knowledge embedded in the clan control mechanisms during the 
development process will improve the performance of the resultant application. 
Hypothesis 1C: Greater use of clan control will enhance the relative market performance of an 
application because it increases the degree to which knowledge is integrated by the application’s 
developer. 
Since self control often consists of evaluation criteria that rewards autonomy and self-management of the 
controllee (Kirsch et al. 2002), high levels of self control require the controllee to act independently in 
governing its own actions.  Within our context, a high degree of self control results in the developer 
believing it can develop a high-quality application without interference or monitoring on the part of the 
platform owner.  As such, the developer eschews the opportunity to gain knowledge from the platform 
owner.  Therefore, the market performance of an application developed under a high degree of self control 
will be purely the result of the capabilities and knowledge stores of the application developer.  Since there 
is a limited amount of knowledge transfer between the platform owner and the developer, there can only 
be a minimal amount of knowledge integration that occurs and performance should suffer. 
Hypothesis 1D: Greater use of self control will reduce the relative market performance of an 
application because it decreases the degree to which knowledge is integrated by the application’s 
developer. 
Application Differentiation 
We define application differentiation as the extent to which an application and subsequent versions of 
the application can be distinguished on actual or perceived characteristics vis-à-vis direct competitors 
by the marketplace. One of the earliest conceptualizations of product differentiation comes from Shaw 
(1912) in which the concept is described as a means by which the producer stimulates demand for its 
product by changing certain characteristics of the product to distinguish it from the other stock 
commodities.  Later conceptualizations have expanded the definition to include characteristics for 
differentiation to be either real or imagined (Chamberlin 1962).  
The marketplace for applications in a platform setting is typically crowded (Tiwana et al. 2010).  If all 
apps had product attributes that are effectively equal, then the app marketplace would resemble a 
commodity market where each producer would claim equal share of the market (Dickson and Ginter 
1987).  In such commodity markets, price becomes the most critical factor in differentiating one product 
from another (Dickson and Ginter 1987).  However, application developers often strive to produce 
applications that are differentiated on factors other than price, especially since there is a floor at which 
price can no longer be lowered (developers cannot pay users to download their applications). When an 
application is sufficiently differentiated from other similar commoditized products on factors other than 
price, it will increase the demand for the application so long as the differentiated product meets the 
customer’s needs (Chamberlin 1962).  In other words, consumers in the marketplace will be more willing 
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to purchase applications that are appropriately differentiated from close competitors on attributes that 
consumers value. 
As was demonstrated in the prepackaged software industry, software vendors can improve their market 
share by purposely reconfiguring resource allocations and the functionality of their products to 
differentiate their products and capitalize on complementarities requested by members in the 
marketplace (Lee et al. 2010).  The prepackaged software industry closely resembles the characteristics of 
applications competing within a platform ecosystem.  In both settings, we see extreme competition 
characterized by software developers rapidly responding to changing user needs.  There are also network 
effects (Katz and Shapiro 1994) present in both settings because the number of users of a particular 
system or application can influence the extent to which potential users wish to utilize the same system.  
We can therefore conclude that application developers who are cognizant of the shifting competitive 
landscape and who appropriately improve their applications to differentiate them from imitators and 
other competitors will earn a greater share of the market and increased market performance. Further, the 
effects of such differentiation can increase significantly in magnitude in the presence of network effects 
because gaining traction within a user base can quickly increase the demand from other potential users 
(Lee et al. 2010). 
Whereas our first set of hypotheses discusses how control mechanisms enable knowledge integration, our 
second set of hypotheses discusses an alternate perspective.  Increasing the extent to which knowledge is 
integrated often makes it difficult to properly differentiate one’s app when the sources of knowledge being 
integrated are the same across competitors.  This paradox is similar to the difficulties organizations face 
in maximizing the antagonistic states of integration and differentiation found in Lawrence & Lorsch’s 
(1967) seminal article.  
When rules and regulations are highly formalized, parties performing work are less likely to experiment 
(March 1958).  Furthermore, when a party is subject to increased monitoring in the process of getting 
work accomplished, it will consider the monitoring and measurement methods of the controller to be 
obtrusive thus resulting in a lower level of commitment to getting the job done (Ouchi 1979).  Such 
monitoring can also lead the developer to focus more on complying with the stated procedural rules than 
on thinking outside the box in order to innovate thereby decreasing the extent to which the resultant 
application is differentiated from competitors. 
Hypothesis 2A: Greater use of process control will reduce the relative market performance of an 
application because it decreases the extent to which the application is differentiated from close 
competitors. 
The application review process (input control) in a platform is meant to ensure applications abide by 
certain standards and requirements laid forth by the platform owner.  In short, the platform owner 
reserves the right to reject any application that appears to violate the rules of the platform.  Hence, 
applications that attempt to implement creative and innovative uses of the platform in hopes of 
differentiating their applications are at a higher risk of being rejected by the platform owner.  It then 
appears as though the use of input control actually dissuades developers from utilizing the platform’s 
functionality in creative and novel ways, which is necessary to properly differentiate one’s application 
from competitors (Dickson and Ginter 1987).  
Hypothesis 2B: Greater use of input control will reduce the relative market performance of an 
application because it decreases the extent to which the application is differentiated from close 
competitors 
Clans survive because of a strong commitment to shared values and high levels of goal congruence (Ouchi 
1980).  Empirical evidence suggests that employees in an organization resembling a clan have higher 
levels of attachment to the organization thus resulting in behaviors that would not violate the set of values 
and beliefs shared by members of the clan (Ouchi and Johnson 1978).  Clans also thrive in an 
environment where there is great ambiguity in attempting to measure individual performance (Ouchi 
1980).  This is primarily due to the fact that individuals within the clan are not seeking to outshine others 
in the clan: everybody is working toward a collective goal.  Further, the clan does not reward opportunistic 
behaviors on the part of its members (Ouchi 1980) and therefore there is little incentive to try to gain 
advantage over another application developer.   
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Hypothesis 2C: Greater use of clan control will reduce the relative market performance of an 
application because it decreases the extent to which the application is differentiated from close 
competitors 
Despite not having access to the knowledge embedded in explicit forms of control, there could be benefits 
associated with the use of self control.  As Tiwana & Keil (2009) noted, self control increases performance 
in internally developed IS projects because it allows the development team the autonomy to creatively 
solve problems so long as the controller trusts the development team to work towards a collective goal.  If 
every app developer is drawing on the same set of guidelines and rules for developing applications, it is 
less likely that there is variance in the quality of applications produced and distributed in the platform 
ecosystem.  By allowing self control, platform owners grant the application developers the freedom to 
innovate freely.   
Hypothesis 2D: Greater use of self control will enhance the relative market performance of an 
application because it increases the extent to which the application is differentiated from close 
competitors 
Endogeneity of Realized Control 
Realized control is endogenous in that app developers choose the degree to which they abide by controls 
issued by the platform owner, a nuance that that has previously been overlooked in IS controls research 
(e.g., Rustagi et al. 2008; Tiwana and Keil 2009). Failure to correct for endogeneity can result in biased 
estimates and incorrect conclusions (Shaver 1998). We use four variables as instrumental variables in the 
model to correct for endogeneity.  First, the perception of the platform owner’s ability to evaluate 
submitted applications (e.g. ability to measure outputs) influences input control because it has been 
shown that a controller who cannot adequately assess the end result of a work task cannot properly 
enforce this type of control (Kirsch et al. 2002).  Knowledge of the transformation (or more specifically, 
development) process (Ouchi 1979) positively influences process control because the controller must 
understand the work processes in order to properly monitor and evaluate them. Clans have high social 
requirements and therefore take a long time to form, thus developer tenure on the platform influences the 
realization of clan control.   Further, clan control is influenced by the presence of shared values, because 
shared values are a necessary requirement for clans to form (Ouchi 1979). 
Rival Explanations of Relative Market Performance 
We are cognizant of the fact that many other factors can influence the performance of applications in a 
platform marketplace.  It is true that most developers multi-home (Armstrong 2006), or participate in 
development activities across multiple platforms. The fact that developers enter into a platform ecosystem 
with varying levels of experience and knowledge requires us to consider numerous rival explanations of 
market performance. Rival explanations can be attributed to characteristics of 1) the application, 2) the 
developer, 3) the marketplace, and 4) the application’s category.  A full list of our control variables is 
provided in Figure 1.  
Methodology 
To test the proposed research model, we will employ a cross-sectional survey to collect primary data.  The 
unit of analysis for this study is the software application.  The context of this study is Research In Motion’s 
(RIM) BlackBerry platform and it was chosen for two reasons. First, the BlackBerry platform is not 
licensed for use on hardware that is produced by vendors other than Research In Motion.  The fact that 
the platform and applications can only run on RIM devices allows us to control for potential confounding 
effects that result from hardware incompatibilities.  Second, the control structure employed in the 
BlackBerry platform also align closely with that of other competing platforms thus allowing our findings 
to be generalizable to the broader population of platforms. The sampling frame is a stratified random 
sample of 1,500 apps in BlackBerry’s app marketplace (App World), excluding e-book and themes 
categories (as they emphasize content rather than functionality). We also eliminated those applications 
that have received less than 5 user-submitted reviews since user reviews are a component of our 
dependent variable and we need an adequate number of reviews to ensure robustness of this measure. 
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This resulted in a total of 8,024 unique applications and 3,479 unique developers. Each developer appears 
only once in our sample population. 
Measures. We intend to follow rigorous scale development and validation procedures as outlined by 
Babbie (1990). Where possible, existing scales will be utilized or adapted. We recognize that a survey 
methodology measures the respondent’s perception of a specific phenomenon.  To this end, we will 
construct our measures in an attempt to focus on the actual behaviors that app developers exhibit in 
response to the different forms of control.  This approach should allow us to capture the extent to which a 
control was realized, and not simply a developer’s perception of the efficacy of the control mechanism.  
Table 1 provides a summary of our measures. 
Table 1: Construct Measures 
Construct Source of measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Average App Rating, Average rating X # of 
ratings 
z-scores of values gathered from Blackberry App 
World 
# of downloads z-scores of values provided by survey respondent 
Types of Control 
Process, Clan, Self Control  Adapted from Kirsch et al. (2002) 
Input Control Newly Developed Scale 
Explanatory Mechanisms 
Knowledge Integration Adapted from Mitchell (2006) 
Application Differentiation Adapted from Chaudhuri & Holbrook (2001) 
Endogenous Instruments 
Ability to Measure Outputs, Knowledge of the 
Transformation Process 
Adapted from Kirsch et al. (2002) 
Shared Values Newly developed scale 
Developer Tenure Single item measure administered in survey 
 
Data Collection and Analysis. A pilot test will be conducted with a small group of Blackberry developers 
to further refine the items. Once primary data are collected, the measurement model will be evaluated and 
psychometric properties will be assessed through confirmatory factor analysis.  Two-stage, instrumental 
variables hierarchical regression will be used to test the hypotheses for two reasons.  First, hierarchical 
regression allows us to account for rival explanations of relative market performance by including our 
control variables as the first step in the hierarchical regression.  Finally, it allows accounting for 
endogeneity of realized control in the model (Heckman 1979) as well as mediation (Sobel 1982). 
Conclusion 
Our intended theoretical contribution is two-fold.  First, we extend our current understanding of control 
to include purposes beyond just aligning interests of two parties.  To do so, we situate control in a 
platform ecosystem, thus allowing us to examine nuances of control, such as realized control, that have 
never been empirically examined. Another unique theoretical contribution lies in the theoretical 
development of the idea that all control mechanisms carry certain costs and that these costs may change 
the direction and/or strength of the influence control has on performance. Our acknowledgement that 
realized control is at least partly influenced by endogenous factors also provides both a theoretical and 
methodological contribution to the existing stream of research on control. We therefore believe that this 
study contributes new insights into the micro-processes of how and why control mechanisms shape 
performance in competitive markets for specialized software complements. 
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